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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the state and trends of democratic efficacy in democratic polities around 
the world. First, it uses data of an on-line survey conducted by DEMOS in 15 European 
countries to provide descriptive data on democratic efficacy. A first step to test the 
association of democratic efficacy indicators with populism was also made, showing that 
most of the items composing democratic efficacy have a negative association with populist 
attitudes. Second, the paper considers problems of a conceptual definition of democratic 
efficacy and suggests that it could be analysed following two conceptualisations: 1) more 
extensive (holistic), coupling political efficacy with citizens’ democratic capacities, and 2) 
less extensive (narrow), coupling political efficacy only with citizens’ support for important 
democratic values. Then the paper discusses the availability of measures of democratic 
efficacy in existing international survey data sets (ESS, ISSP, EVS, CSES, EES, and 
Eurobarometer). Further, the report empirically assesses the trends of democratic efficacy 
in a temporal comparative perspective using data from two waves (2004 and 2014) of the 
ISSP module ‘Citizenship’. Results show that the majority of the populations in the studied 
countries score low on both internal (a little more than 50 %) and external (a little more than 
70 %) political efficacy and, overall, changes over the last decades are negligible. However, 
levels of political efficacy are quite different across countries and there is substantial cross-
time variation for at least half of the studied countries. According to our data, there is a 
general tendency of lower levels of political efficacy in the CEE countries. Also, in some 
(mostly Western) countries political efficacy increased from 2004 to 2014. With regard to 
the support for values of liberal democracy we found that it is moderate (overall, only half 
the studied populations showed strong support for these values) and rather stable. However, 
at the country level, we found quite a lot of variation both across countries and over time. 
These cross-country and cross-time differences need to be further studied with multilevel 
models including macro (country) level explanatory variables. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The first systematic studies of voting behaviour started in the early 1950s leading to interest in 
political efficacy mostly due to the fact that it was found to be one of the most important 
predictors of political participation. Since political participation was always considered an 
important feature of democratic government, high political efficacy of citizens was 
consequently deemed an important characteristic of good democratic governance. However, at 
the beginning of this century many studies of political behaviour found decreasing levels of 
political participation in the Western1 democracies during the twentieth century (see for a recent 
example Blais 2010), which was sometimes seen as an indicator of declining quality of 
democracy. More recently, the decline in political participation seems to have stabilized and in 
some countries even increasing levels of political participation have been detected. However, 
increasing numbers of people participating in politics started supporting populist and extremist 
political actors (for increasing populist voting on both left and right of the political spectrum 
see https://populismindex.com). Consequently, it has become clear that only the crude level of 
political participation is an insufficient (or even misleading) indicator of the quality of 
democratic governance, and democratic quality of political participation should be taken into 
consideration, too. 
The same seems to apply to the concept of political efficacy. Political efficacy is an important 
motivational background for political participation, but it can say nothing about its democratic 
quality. Therefore, to make the concept fit the contemporary challenges of political science and 
political realities, it seems reasonable to supplement it with a democratic component. The 
DEMOS project developed the concept of democratic efficacy for this purpose (see Bene – 
Boda, 2020). In this paper we use data of an on-line survey conducted by DEMOS in 15 
European countries to provide descriptive data on democratic efficacy. We make the first step 
to test the association of democratic efficacy indicators with populism, showing that most of 
the items composing democratic efficacy have a negative association with populist attitudes. 
Then we come back to the problems of conceptual definition of democratic efficacy and propose 
broader as well as narrower (minimal) definitions of democratic efficacy. Then we discuss 
availability of measures of democratic efficacy in existing international survey data sets (ESS, 
ISSP, EVS, CSES, EES, and Eurobarometer). Further, we empirically assess the trends of 
                                                 
1 Importantly, it is even lower in the democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
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democratic efficacy in a temporal comparative perspective using data from two waves (2004 
and 2014) of the ISSP module “Citizenship”. We finalize our paper with conclusions. 
2. Defining democratic efficacy 
 
The concept of political efficacy is quite well-researched and interest in it dates back to a 
classical political behaviour study of Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954). The authors proposed 
that the “sense of political efficacy may be defined as the feeling that individual political action 
does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform 
one’s civic duties. It is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the 
individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change” (Campbell et al. 1954: 187). 
As such political efficacy was hypothesised to strongly determine whether people would 
participate in the political processes and this emphasis in empirical studies continues to this day 
(see Valentino, Gregorowicz, Groenendyk 2009; Marx, Nguyen 2016; de Zúñiga, Diehl, 
Ardévol-Abreu 2017). 
Lane (1959) already distinguished two dimensions of political efficacy: a person’s image of the 
self and that of the government. Consequently, internal and external dimensions of political 
efficacy have been conceptualised and used in political studies (Balch 1974; Craig, Maggiotto 
1982; Acock, Clarke, Stewart 1985; Craig, Niemi, Silver 1990; Niemi, Craig, Mattei 1991). 
Broadly speaking, internal political efficacy refers to citizens’ beliefs that they have 
competences to understand and effectively participate in politics (subjective competence), and 
external political efficacy is related to public perceptions of responsiveness of governmental 
institutions (perceived system responsiveness). Importantly, low political efficacy means that 
citizens distrust governmental institutions and do not believe that their actions will have an 
effect on the governance. Therefore, low political efficacy is related to political alienation, 
which is detrimental to the health of a democratic political system. 
However, in recent studies measurement and analysis of political efficacy as an important 
motivational background for political participation brought an important disconcerting insight 
to light. Namely, any increase in general political participation appeared to be related to populist 
voting and increasing support for populist attitudes and activism. Therefore, the standard causal 
logic relating higher levels of political efficacy with growing political participation and, 
consequently, with increased quality of democratic governance appeared to be tenuous. Thus, 
to make the concept of political efficacy fit the contemporary challenges of democratic 
Copyright MORKEVIČIUS et al. (2019). 
5 
governance, it seems reasonable to supplement it with a democratic component. We propose 
that democratic participation is enabled by higher level of political efficacy that is paired with 
certain democratic capacities. 
Bene and Boda (2020) discerned five groups of democratic capacities and values that have to 
be paired with political efficacy in order to derive a measure of democratic efficacy: 
 Factual political knowledge (citizens need to have some general political 
knowledge, but also keep up with the day-to-day political processes). 
 Political news consumption (citizens need to develop habits of using the media for 
political information in a reflective manner). 
 Political reflexivity (citizens have to be reflective on the political information, 
however, strong emotional attachments (political identities) may undermine this 
reflexivity and introduce serious biases in reasoning and evaluation of political 
information). 
 Core values of democracy (citizens are required to embrace certain values as 
prerequisites of democracy in order to make it work properly: respect for political 
and legal equality (equality of interests), capability of making free and autonomous 
decisions (political autonomy), tolerance and listening to opinions different from 
their own (reciprocity). 
 Political or civic skills (citizens have to be at ease with practising certain behaviours 
and attitudes: coping with plurality and conflicts in politics and policy; scrutinising 
leaders and their decisions; being able to express one’s own legitimate needs, 
aspirations and preferences). 
Based on this conceptualisation people with complete democratic capacities are those citizens 
who have (1) a certain level of factual political knowledge; (2) are regular and reflective news 
consumers; (3) are non-intensive partisans (as a proxy of reflexivity); (4) strongly identify with 
the core values of democracy, i.e. political and legal equality, tolerance towards dissenting 
opinion, and individual autonomy, and (5) have some involvement in political activities. 
In order to measure the levels of democratic efficacy Bene and Boda (2020) turned to survey 
data available in the major international academically driven surveys. They employed data from 
the European Social Survey (ESS) well-known for its rigorous cross-cultural design. The eighth 
round of the ESS conducted in 2016-2017 contained items for the measurement of both political 
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efficacy and democratic capacities with the exception of political knowledge. In the ESS 
questionnaire political news consumption was measured by the question of how many minutes 
respondents spend consuming political news on a regular day. They consider regular news 
consumers those respondents who read, watch or listen to news at least 30 minutes on a regular 
day. Regarding partisanship, closeness to a political party was measured on a 4-point scale, and 
only the extreme value indicating ‘very close’ was regarded as a highly partisan answer. 
Participants were also asked to what extent they identify with certain character types and values 
on a 6-point scale. Three items of the ESS survey are closely related to the three core values of 
democracy discussed above. In detail, values of 1 and 2 indicate identification with these 
statements as they were labelled as ‘very much like me’ and ‘like me’ respectively. Our political 
activity measure was based on the ESS questionnaire items measuring involvement in different 
types of political activity. Table 1 shows the share of respondents who meet these criteria for 
each component of our democratic capacities concept. 
Table 1. The share of respondents of the eighth round of ESS based on available measures 
of democratic capacities 
 
News 
consumption 
Partisanship Equality Tolerance Autonomy 
Political 
activity 
Criteria 
At least 30 
min. per day 
1 – 3 (4-
point scale) 
1-2 (6-point scale) At least 1 
Percent 79.4 95.2 71.5 65.2 68.5 52.0 
Source: Bene and Boda (2020) 
The findings above suggest that all of these capacities are widely shared in the democratic 
countries under investigation. The large majority of respondents share the following democratic 
capacities: they consume news regularly, are non-intensive partisans, and they believe in the 
values of equality, tolerance and individual autonomy. More than half of them have been 
involved in at least one political activity during the preceding 12 months. 
However, Table 2 indicates that their combined presence is not as universal: only a fifth of the 
respondents have all these democratic capacities, while the large majority of respondents have 
incomplete capacities. These findings suggest that these capacities are suitable to let us 
categorise respondents: their validity is supported by their wide presence in democratic 
countries, but their combined occurrence can differentiate people with greater or lesser 
democratic capacities. 
Table 2. The share of respondents of the eighth round of ESS based on the mixture of their 
democratic capacities 
People with complete democratic capacities People with incomplete democratic capacities 
19.5 % 80.5 % 
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Source: Bene and Boda (2020) 
 
 
3. Democratic efficacy and populism 
 
In 2019 an original on-line survey was undertaken in 15 European countries (Germany, the UK, 
Czechia, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, France, Slovakia, Lithuania, Denmark, 
Turkey, Spain, Greece, and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Our desired representative sample size 
amounted to approximately 500 respondents per country, while quotas based on current census 
data were set up for gender, age and geographical region. The fundamental Eligibility Criterion 
for respondents was having lived in their current country of residence for at least 10 years, 
which we consider a sufficient time frame to feel at home in the country of residence. The 
questionnaire of the survey was developed by the researchers of the DEMOS project and the 
survey was administered by the University of Amsterdam. 
Based on the data of this survey we make a first attempt to use the concept of democratic 
efficacy as well as to test the association between democratic efficacy and populist attitudes. In 
our analysis we addressed the following questions: 
 
Descriptive research questions: 
 RQ1. How are our respondents distributed among the categories of the typology of 
political efficacy (23.1 – 24.2) (i.e. high, low, paternalist, sceptics – see, Bene and 
Boda, 2020) by country. 
 RQ2. What share of our respondents does have complete democratic capacities (i.e. 
follow news at least some days [25.1]; not extremely partisan [mean above 5] [17.1 
– 18.5]; identify with democratic values [equality, tolerance, autonomy] [at least 
somewhat agree] [20.1 – 20.3]) by country. 
 RQ3. How are our respondents distributed among the categories of the typology of 
democratic efficacy (i.e. political efficacy + democratic capacities, see, Bene and 
Boda, 2020). 
 
Inferential research questions: 
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 RQ4. What is the connection between external political efficacy (23.1 – 23.2) and 
populist attitudes (12.1 – 16.5). 
 RQ5. What is the connection between internal political efficacy (24.1 – 24.2) and 
populist attitudes. 
 RQ7. What is the connection between democratic capacities (complete vs. 
incomplete) and populist attitudes. 
 RQ8. What is the connection between the typology of democratic efficacy and 
populist attitudes. 
 
Findings: 
RQ1. How are our respondents distributed among the categories of the typology of political 
efficacy (23.1 – 24.2) (i.e. high, low, paternalist, sceptics – see, Bene and Boda, 2020) by 
country. 
Note: Both EE and IE are constructed from two items respectively by taking their average. All 
four items are measured on a 7-point Likert scale where the larger values indicate higher level 
of efficacy. Mean values above 4 are considered ‘high’ level and under 4 are ‘low’ level of 
efficacy. Respondents who were placed at the middle value (4) in each of the constructed EE or 
IE variables were not considered in the typology (45.5% of the respondents).  
As indicated in Table 3, 41.8% of respondents have low levels of political efficacy, while 24.7% 
of them are efficacious. As for the mixed types, more than a fourth of citizens have high levels 
of internal and low levels of external political efficacy and can therefore be labelled as sceptics, 
while only an 8% of them are paternalist, i.e. have low levels of internal and high levels of 
external political efficacy. However, there are remarkable variations between countries. In CEE 
(except Lithuania) and some Mediterranean countries (Italy, Greece, France), the share of 
people with high levels of PE is smaller, while they have a larger share of people with low PE 
than in Western-European countries.  The proportion of paternalists is higher in Lithuania, 
Czech Republic, Turkey, and Greece, while the most sceptical respondents were found in 
Bosnia, Slovakia, Denmark and the UK. 
 
Table 3. Share of the respondents based on the level of their political efficacy by country 
and mean values of external and internal efficacy by country (last two columns) 
 
Country 
Political efficacy (%) Resp. on middle 
value on each 
variable 
EE IE 
High Low Paternalists Sceptics Mean 
Germany 35% 40% 5% 20% 37% 3.61 4.22 
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Country 
Political efficacy (%) Resp. on middle 
value on each 
variable 
EE IE 
High Low Paternalists Sceptics Mean 
UK 32.4% 32.8% 4.3% 30.5% 40.1% 3.64 4.37 
Czechia 11.6% 56.4% 12.2% 19.8% 38% 3.29 3.53 
Hungary 8.7% 64.6% 6.3% 20.5% 29.4% 2.82 3.39 
Italy 23.4% 43.7% 8.3% 24.6% 37.1% 3.45 3.95 
Netherlands 39.1% 30.6% 5.8% 24.5% 41.8% 3.74 4.36 
Poland 21.8% 48.7% 8.2% 21.2% 38.5% 3.33 3.78 
France 23.1% 53.4% 7.2% 16.3% 39.3% 3.44 3.77 
Slovakia 14.5% 44.9% 9.5% 31.1% 37.9% 3.36 4.01 
Lithuania 35.4% 30.1% 13% 21.4% 38% 3.90 4.17 
Denmark 44.3% 18% 7% 30.6% 34.1% 3.95 4.56 
Turkey 26.1% 33.6% 12.1% 28.3% 35.1% 3.60 4.28 
Spain 32.5% 34.4% 9.8% 23.3% 36.5% 3.69 4.10 
Greece 15.1% 45.1% 10.4% 29.4% 31.2% 3.29 3.90 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
8.6% 51.7% 2% 37.7% 30.8% 
2.79 3.92 
Total 24.7% 41.8% 7.9% 25.6% 36.5% 3.46 4.03 
 
RQ2. What share of our respondents does have complete democratic capacities (i.e. follow news 
at least some days [25.1]; not extremely partisan [mean above 5] [17.1 – 18.5]; identify with 
democratic values [equality, tolerance, autonomy] [at least somewhat agree] [20.1 – 20.3]) by 
country. 
There are slightly more people in our sample who have incomplete democratic capacities, but 
more than 46.4% of our respondents have complete democratic capacities (see Table 4). It is 
difficult to find clear geographical patterns behind the country-level variations, but it is 
noticeable that in Mediterranean countries (Greece, Bosnia, Spain, Italy) more people have 
complete democratic capacities than in other countries. It is also interesting that in some 
Western-European countries the proportion of people with complete DC is rather low 
(Denmark, Netherlands, France). 
 
Table 4. Share of the respondents based on the level of their democratic capacities by 
country 
 
Country Democratic capacities 
Incomplete Complete 
Germany 49.4% 50.6% 
UK 50.5% 49.5% 
Czech Rep. 70.1% 29.9% 
Hungary 57% 43% 
Italy 52.8% 47.2% 
Netherlands 63.4% 36.3% 
Poland 59.1% 40.9% 
France 58.1% 41.9% 
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Slovakia 59.3% 40.7% 
Lithuania 38.7% 61.3% 
Denmark 63.9% 36.1% 
Turkey 56.2% 43.8% 
Spain 47.5% 52.5% 
Greece 37.6% 62.4% 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 43.1 56.9% 
TOTAL 53.6% 46.4% 
 
RQ3. How are our respondents distributed among the categories of the typology of democratic 
efficacy (i.e. political efficacy + democratic capacities, see Bene and Boda, 2020)? 
Only one in ten people have both complete democratic capacities and high levels of political 
efficacy (see Table 5). At the other end of the typology, 21 % of the respondents have both 
incomplete democratic capacities and low level of political efficacy. Interestingly enough, a 
large share of respondents with low political efficacy have complete democratic capacities, 
while 13 % of the respondents have both high levels of political efficacy and incomplete 
capacities. Half of the sceptics have complete and the other half have incomplete democratic 
capacities. 
 
Table 5. The share of the respondents in the intersections of democratic capacities and 
political efficacy 
 
Democratic capacities Political efficacy Total 
High Low Paternalist Sceptics 
Complete democratic capacities 11.2% 20.6% 4.2% 12.8% 49.1% 
Incomplete capacities 13.2% 21.2% 3.7% 12.8% 50.9% 
Total 24.7% 41.8% 7.9% 25.6% 100% 
 
RQ4. What is the connection between external political efficacy (23.1 – 23.2) and populist 
attitudes (12.1 – 16.5)? 
The scale of populist attitude is constructed from 13 items by averaging them. External political 
efficacy and populist attitudes a significantly and negatively correlated and the effect size is 
fairly remarkable. People with low level of external political efficacy have more populist 
attitudes (p < 0.001; Pearson R = -0.375). 
 
RQ5. What is the connection between internal political efficacy (24.1 – 24.2) and populist 
attitudes? 
Internal political efficacy is also significantly and negatively related to populist attitudes, but 
here the effect size is much smaller, only a weak relationship exists between the variables. 
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However, people with low level of internal political efficacy have rather more populist attitudes 
(p < 0.001; Pearson R= -0.046). 
 
RQ7. What is the connection between democratic capacities (complete vs. incomplete) and 
populist attitudes? 
A weak, but significant negative association exists between democratic capacities and populist 
attitudes, too. People with incomplete democratic capacities are more likely to have populist 
attitudes (p < 0.01; Pearson’s R = -0.032). 
 
RQ8. What is the connection between the typology of democratic efficacy and populist 
attitudes? 
Table 6 shows the mean values of populist attitudes for each category of democratic efficacy. It 
seems that the most populist subcategory is people who are sceptics with incomplete democratic 
capacities, followed by the ‘incomplete capacities with low PE’ and ‘complete capacities with 
low PE’ categories. The less populist respondents are those who have complete democratic 
capacities and high levels of political efficacy. Interestingly enough, paternalists are also less 
populist, moreover, paternalists with incomplete democratic capacities are even a little less 
populist than those with complete capacities. 
 
Table 6. Mean values of populist attitudes by the categories of democratic efficacy. (SDs 
are in parentheses) 
 
Democratic efficacy Populist attitudes 
Incomplete capacities with low PE 5.05 (.66) 
Complete capacities with low PE 5.02 (.65) 
Incomplete capacities with paternalist PE 4.48 (.74) 
Complete capacities with paternalist PE 4.56 (.64) 
Incomplete capacities with sceptics PE 5.11 (.67) 
Complete capacities with sceptics PE  
Incomplete capacities with high PE 4.69 (.76) 
Complete capacities with high PE 4.38 (.74) 
TOTAL 4.88 (.73) 
 
 
Additional analysis 
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Table 7 shows that at least a two-third majority of the respondents meet our criteria for each 
democratic capacity in each country. Consequently, there are widely shared capacities in all 
European countries under investigation. In the case of news consumption, a remarkable gap 
exists between CEE and Western European countries.  Except for Lithuania, the smallest 
percentages of regular news consumers can be found in CEE countries. In the case of 
partisanship, the variance is minor among the countries as most of them are between 75 % and 
82 %, but there are some outlier cases such as the strongly partisan Turkey or Netherlands, or 
the least partisan Lithuania. Equality as a value is the least popular in Denmark (!) and the 
Czech Republic, while they are highly favoured in some South European countries such as 
Greece, Spain, Bosnia and Turkey. Smaller variances can be found in the case of the two other 
values. However, it is remarkable that all of these values are highly popular in Bosnia, 
Lithuania, Greece and Spain. 
 
Table 7. Share of respondents who meet our criteria for each democratic capacity 
 
Country News cons. Non-partisan Equality Tolerance Autonomy 
Germany 89% 81% 78% 85% 90% 
UK 84% 77% 86% 86% 90% 
Czechia 74% 76% 72% 83% 91% 
Hungary 74% 82% 84% 85% 91% 
Italy 89% 75% 85% 87% 86% 
Netherlands 79% 72% 79% 82% 85% 
Poland 77% 80% 82% 85% 88% 
France 79% 81% 80% 83% 85% 
Slovakia 74% 80% 82% 83% 91% 
Lithuania 86% 87% 89% 92% 95% 
Denmark 86% 78% 68% 82% 83% 
Turkey 92% 61% 91% 89% 92% 
Spain 91% 76% 90% 88% 90% 
Greece 88% 85% 93% 91% 92% 
Bosnia-Her. 75% 87% 94% 94% 95% 
TOTAL 83% 79% 84% 86% 90% 
 
Looking at the bivariate correlation between different components of democratic capacities, it 
seems that partisanship is an outlier component (see Table 8). While there is a significant 
positive relationship between news consumption and the values of equality, tolerance and 
autonomy, non-partisanship is significantly and negatively correlated with each of them. Those 
who consume news at least some days are more likely to agree with the values of equality, 
tolerance and autonomy. At the same time, less partisan people consume news infrequently and 
they are more likely to be neutral or negative with these values. The strongest correlation is 
found between the three democratic values. 
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Table 8. Bivariate correlations between the components of democratic capacities 
 
 News cons. Non-partisan Equality Tolerance Autonomy 
News cons.  -.132** .075** .111** .096** 
Non-partisan   -.064** -.075** -.058** 
Equality    .430** .427** 
Tolerance     .481** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Table 9. Bivariate correlations between the components of democratic capacities and 
populism 
 
Democratic capacities Populism 
News consumption .009 
Non-partisan -.165** 
Equality .136** 
Tolerance .121** 
Autonomy .222** 
 
Interestingly, democratic values are significantly and positively correlated with populist 
attitudes (see Table 9). It seems that democratic values and populist attitudes are not mutually 
exclusive. The only democratic capacity that significantly decreases populist attitudes is non-
partisanship, the component that is significantly negatively associated with the other democratic 
components. Non-extremely partisan citizens are less likely to identify with populist attitudes. 
News consumption is not significantly associated with populism, but when its interval variety 
is considered there is a small (R = 0.051), but significant (p < 0.001) relationship between the 
two variables showing that more frequent news consumption is correlated with less populist 
attitudes. 
 
4. Measuring democratic efficacy across time and countries 
 
As our survey above demonstrates, the measurement of the full set of democratic capacities 
coupled with political efficacy is empirically possible and provides interesting results, but only 
with data from quite recent surveys (ESS, Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems, 
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International Social Survey Programme). Unfortunately, analysis of time trends seems to be 
hardly available, since either political efficacy or democratic capacities are not measured in the 
same way in repeated rounds of major international social surveys. 
Therefore, we simultaneously propose a different — narrower — conceptualisation of 
democratic political efficacy, which basically remains on the attitudinal level. Thus, if we 
remain on the attitudinal level, the most important addition to the concept of political efficacy 
is that of certain democratic attitudes. Thus, we propose a narrow definition of democratic 
efficacy conceptualised as a personal sense of political efficacy (either internal, or external, or 
both) coupled with certain core democratic values. Then a person that could be described as 
democratically efficacious should feel confident about his/her ability to effectively participate 
in politics, feel that government is responsive to his/her needs and also subscribe to certain core 
democratic values. 
As a conceptualisation (and, to a certain extent, a measurement) of political efficacy (both 
internal and external) is already established, clearly defining which democratic values should 
be included into the concept of democratic efficacy remains a remarkable challenge. Indeed, 
this may be a daunting task, as the vast literature on theories of democracy, quality of democracy 
and its measurement abound. However, here we follow definitions of democracy that may be 
called sophisticated procedural or procedural with prerequisites (see general characterisation in 
Brettschneider 2006: 262-266). Importantly, every definition of democracy starts from the most 
important features — elections and voting. Every regime that wants to be called a democracy 
must be a political system where rulers are selected by competitive elections, that is, by citizens 
voting in free and fair elections for candidates and their supported policies. Procedural (or 
electoral, minimal) definitions of democracy are inclined to stop here as advocated by 
Schumpeter (1942) or Przeworski (1999). However, the majority of other theorists of 
democracy proceed further and suggest various additional features that are necessary for a truly 
democratic regime. 
The largest part of them subscribe to an adjective ‘liberal’ and propose definitions of ‘liberal 
democracy’. This group of scholars follows the tradition of Robert Dahl (1956, 1971) and his 
conception of pluralist democracy or polyarchy. Dahl (1989) formulated five prerequisites for 
democracy: 
 Inclusiveness, or equality of all citizens within the state and ability to get involved 
in the political process. 
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 Voting equality at the decisive stage, or weight equality of each citizen’s vote when 
decisions are taken (voted upon). 
 Enlightened understanding, or ample and equal opportunities to discover 
information about political matters and base their decisions on this information. 
 Control of the agenda, or the opportunity for citizens to decide which political 
matters are important and which of them should be discussed and decided upon. 
 Effective participation, or adequate and equal opportunities of citizens to form their 
preferences and express them on the public agenda. 
While the first three criteria are rather procedural and every scholar advocating a minimal 
definition of democracy could subscribe to them, the two remaining would be problematic, as 
they require that citizens (not politicians) control the substance of politics and be free in 
formulating and expressing their policy preferences. The last requirement most directly points 
in the direction of liberal democracy as certain liberties are indicated as prerequisites of 
democratic government. All in all, definitions of liberal democracy formulate certain individual 
rights and principles of governance that are crucial prerequisites of a democratic regime. 
One of the most comprehensive attempts to formulate the prerequisites (as well as a definition) 
of liberal democracy2 was developed by Diamond and Morlino (2005). These authors (together 
with a team of fellow researchers) identified five procedural, two substantive and one results-
oriented dimension of (representative) democracy (see pages x-xxxi): 
 Procedural dimensions: 
o Rule of law, which means that all citizens are equal before the law, and that 
the laws themselves are clear, publicly known, universal, relatively stable, 
non-retroactive, and fairly and consistently applied to all citizens by an 
independent judiciary. Importantly, the legal system defends democratic 
procedures, upholds citizens’ civil and political rights, and reinforces the 
authority of other agencies of horizontal accountability. 
o Participation, which implies that all adult citizens have formal rights of 
political participation, including the right to vote, and are able to make use 
of these formal rights by being able to organise, assemble, protest, lobby for 
                                                 
2 Other versions of similar definitions abound (see, for example, Schmitter, Karl 1991; 
O’Donnell, Cullell, Iazzetta 2004; Bühlmann, Kriesi 2013). 
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their interests, and otherwise influence the decision-making processes. 
Importantly, effective participation requires political as well as basic 
socioeconomic equality, tolerance of political and social differences and 
effective implementation of the rule of law. 
o Competition, which requires that political systems have regular, free, and fair 
electoral competition among various political actors. It also implies 
openness of access to the electoral arena for new political forces, the ease 
with which incumbents can be defeated, and equality of access to the mass 
media and campaign funding for the competing political actors. Importantly, 
effective competition requires functioning horizontal accountability (an 
independent electoral commission) and effective implementation of the rule 
of law. 
o Vertical accountability, which obliges elected political leaders to answer for 
their political decisions when asked by citizens or other constitutional 
bodies. Importantly, vertical accountability may be extended beyond 
elections and encompass also efforts of civic associations, NGOs, social 
movements, think tanks, and mass media to hold governments accountable 
in between elections. Effective competition and participation as well as the 
rule of law are necessary for effective functioning of vertical accountability. 
o Horizontal accountability, which requires that officeholders are answerable 
to other institutional actors that have the expertise and legal authority to 
control and sanction their behaviour. Governmental agencies and institutions 
must have their sphere of competence and yet be accountable to some 
supervising or controlling body. The vitality of horizontal accountability 
very much depends on a legal system that enables the exertion of checks and 
balances by public entities that are independent of the government. 
 Substantive dimensions: 
o Freedom, which consists of three types of rights: political, civil, and social 
or socioeconomic. Political rights include rights to vote, to run for office, to 
campaign, and to organise political parties. They make possible effective 
political participation and competition as well as vertical accountability. 
Essential civil rights include personal liberty, security, and privacy; freedom 
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of thought, expression, and information; freedom of religion; freedom of 
assembly, association, and organisation; freedom of movement and 
residence; the right to legal defence and due process. However, rights and 
freedoms are subject to exceptions and qualifications, that is, some liberties 
may encroach on other social values, such as preventing disorder or 
protecting public health and safety. 
o Equality, which means, first of all, formal political equality of citizens 
requiring the same rights and legal protections for every citizen, access to 
justice and power as well as the prohibition of discrimination on various 
grounds. Importantly, political equality should not be decoupled from social 
and economic correlates, as at least some basic social and economic 
resources are required in order to effectively exercise one’s political rights. 
 Results dimension: 
o Responsiveness, which requires that governments, parties and politicians 
respond to the expectations, interests, needs, and demands of citizens. This 
implies that from the point of view of good governance, democratic 
institutions have to formulate and implement policies that citizens want. 
Thus, responsiveness is closely related to vertical accountability. 
It is clear from the definition and conceptualisation provided above that there are certain basic 
procedural criteria of democracy, which are enhanced by additional substantive and results 
oriented features3. Therefore, respect for core procedural attributes of ‘good’ democracy should 
be the building blocks onto which we could base our definition of democratic political efficacy. 
However, for a well-functioning democracy they are not sufficient and at least a certain level 
of other criteria should be realised4. All in all, concept and measures of democratic efficacy 
should include traditional definitions and indicators of the sense of political efficacy together 
with conceptual and operational definitions of respect for core procedural democratic criteria 
and at least some substantive and/or results oriented attributes of democracy. In the next section 
                                                 
3 Cumulative nature of the features of democracy is clearly stated in the conceptualisation itself: 
procedural criteria are called ‘basic’ and the remaining criteria are identified as ‘goals of ideal 
democracy’ and ‘broader standards of good governance’ (Diamond, Morlino 2005: x-xi). 
4 The idea that substantive and results oriented criteria should be treated not as absolute 
necessary norms of democracy, but as to a certain degree attainable desirable attributes of 
democracy is supported by Coppedge (2004). 
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we proceed with an overview of data sources that could be used for the measurement of 
democratic efficacy across time and countries. 
 
The components of democratic efficacy in international surveys  
In order to be able to study the state and trends of democratic efficacy in democratic polities 
around the world, we need to find appropriate indicators in the existing data sources collected 
by longitudinal international surveys. We performed a search among the variables of the most 
important socio-political surveys: European Social Survey (ESS), International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP), European Election Studies (EES), European Values Study (EVS), 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and Eurobarometer. Two criteria for 
evaluation were employed: availability and consistency of measurement of political efficacy, 
core values of democracy, political knowledge, news consumption, political attachment (party 
or ideological identification), and political skills (political participation besides voting). Results 
of the survey are presented in Table 10. 
Table 10. Indicator availability in major longitudinal international socio-political 
surveys 
Concepts ESS ISSP EES EVS CSES 
Euroba-
rometer 
Political efficacy 
Measured, but 
inconsistently 
Measured in 
some waves 
Not measured Not measured 
Measured in 
some waves 
External 
measured in 
some waves 
Core values of 
democracy 
Consistent 
measurement 
Measured in 
some waves 
Measured 
inconsistently 
in some waves 
Not measured 
Measured 
inconsistently 
in some waves 
Measured 
inconsistently 
in some waves 
Political 
knowledge 
Not measured Not measured 
Measured in 
only one wave 
Not measured 
Measured in 
only one wave 
Measured in 
some waves, 
(only EU) 
News 
consumption 
Measured, but 
inconsistently 
Measured 
inconsistently 
in some waves 
Measured, but 
inconsistently 
Measured, but 
inconsistently 
Not measured 
Measured in 
some waves 
Political 
attachment 
Consistent 
measurement 
Consistent 
measurement 
Consistent 
measurement 
Consistent 
measurement 
Consistent 
measurement 
Measured in 
most waves 
Political skills 
Consistent 
measurement 
Measured in 
some waves 
Not measured 
Consistent 
measurement 
Not measured Not measured 
 
Since indicators of political efficacy are most important when attempting to measure democratic 
efficacy, we first studied their availability. It appeared that the most systematic measurement 
was available in the ISSP modules ‘Role of Government’ and ‘Citizenship’. These two modules 
include both internal and external efficacy measures and span at least 10 years. The ESS 
measures political efficacy inconsistently: items were excluded in some waves and 
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measurement differs between the earlier and more recent waves. It would only be possible to 
consistently study internal and external efficacy for the span of the last five to six years. 
Unfortunately, EES, EVS and Eurobarometer do not include any consistent longitudinal 
measurement of political efficacy at all. The same is mostly true for the surveys included in 
CSES (measures of political efficacy were included only in recent waves). All in all, the only 
two major longitudinal international socio-political surveys that could be used for measurement 
of political efficacy are the ISSP and the ESS. 
After further consideration, however, the ESS was also eliminated as its measurement of 
political efficacy spans only the last three waves (five to six years) and another very important 
measure for evaluating democratic efficacy — values of liberal democracy — do not include 
indicators of support for procedural democracy5. Further, looking at the questions in the ISSP 
module ‘Role of Government’ we could see that political efficacy is only measured by single 
items and measures of liberal democracy are almost absent. Therefore, for our empirical study 
we selected items form the ISSP module ‘Citizenship’. This module was conducted in 2004 and 
in 2014. Thus, it provides a sufficiently long perspective in order to be able to discern certain 
trends of stability or change. 
More importantly, this module included two items measuring both internal and external 
efficacy, and many items measuring public support for values of liberal democracy: 
 External political efficacy: 
o To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 People like me don't have any say about what the government does (Q33 
2004; Q37 2014). 
 I don't think the government cares much what people like me think (Q34 
2004; Q38 2014). 
 Internal political efficacy: 
o To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues 
facing [COUNTRY] (Q35 2004; Q39 2014). 
                                                 
5 The ideal case here would have been the ESS module on ‘Democracy perceptions and 
evaluations’. However, it does not include any items measuring political efficacy. 
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 I think most people in [COUNTRY] are better informed about politics 
and government than I am (Q36 2004; Q40 2014). 
 Support for values of liberal democracy: 
o There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a good citizen. As far as 
you are concerned personally on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important 
and 7 is very important, how important is it: 
 Always to vote in elections (Q1 2004; Q1 2014). 
 Always to obey laws and regulations (Q3 2004; Q3 2014). 
 To keep watch on the actions of government (Q4 2004; Q4 2014). 
 To be active in social or political associations (Q5 2004; Q5 2014). 
 To try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions (Q6 
2004; Q6 2014). 
o There are different opinions about people's rights in a democracy. On a scale of 
1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is 
it: 
 That government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities 
(Q28 2004; Q29 2014). 
The measures of political efficacy are rather traditional and after performing principal 
components analysis on them (separately for 2004 and 2014) we discovered that they do 
distinguish into two scales: internal and external efficacy (see Table 11). However, for our 
further analysis we constructed three separate scales of: internal efficacy (averaging two PC1 
items), external efficacy (averaging two PC2 items) and political efficacy (averaging all items). 
Even though the principal components analysis showed differentiation of public evaluations of 
internal and external efficacy items, we also merged them in order to construct a common scale 
of political efficacy and explore trends of more general democratic political efficacy. 
Table 11. Principal components analysis of political efficacy items in the ISSP module 
‘Citizenship’: varimax rotated solutions 
Items 
2004 2014 
PC1 PC2 PC1 PC2 
People like me don't have any say about 
what the government does 
0.6902  0.6830  
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Items 
2004 2014 
PC1 PC2 PC1 PC2 
I don't think the government cares much 
what people like me think 
0.6929  0.6889  
I feel I have a pretty good understanding 
of the important political issues facing 
country 
 0.7716  0.7869 
I think most people in country are better 
informed about politics and government 
than I am 
 0.6358  0.6160 
Eigenvalues (only > 1) 1.58 1.28 1.58 1.24 
Variance explained (%) 39.39 32.06 39.55 31.12 
Total variance explained (%) 71.45 70.67 
Data source: the ISSP modules ‘Citizenship’. 
Notes: Kaiser normalisation applied; loadings < 0.3 suppressed. 
 
As was discussed previously, the ISSP module ‘Citizenship’ contains at least six items 
measuring public support of values of liberal democracy. They (in totality) reflect (at least 
partially) all the important characteristics or criteria of a liberal democracy presented in the 
theoretical part: 
 There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a good citizen. As far as you 
are concerned personally on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 
is very important, how important is it: 
 Always to vote in elections (Participation, Vertical accountability, 
Responsiveness). 
 Always to obey laws and regulations (Rule of law, Horizontal 
accountability). 
 To keep watch on the actions of government (Vertical accountability, 
Responsiveness). 
 To be active in social or political associations (Participation, 
Competition, Freedom). 
 To try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions 
(Equality, Competition). 
 There are different opinions about people's rights in a democracy. On a scale of 1 to 
7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it: 
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 That government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities 
(Freedom, Equality). 
In order to investigate, whether these items could be subsumed into a single scale of support 
for liberal democratic values, we performed principal components analysis (separately for 2004 
and 2014). The results (see Table 12) showed that the items could be considered as loading on 
a single component as there is only one eigenvalue larger than 1. However, the single 
component solution explains only about 40 % of variance of the items and the last item from 
the different question battery loads poorly on the first component. On the other hand, 
Cronbach’s alpha calculated for the scale including all the six items approaches 0.7 
(2004=0.6845 and 2014=0.6875), which we consider to be an acceptable indicator of 
consistency. All in all, we constructed a scale of support for values of liberal democracy 
averaging all the six items. 
Table 12. Principal components analysis of items corresponding to values of liberal 
democracy in the ISSP module ‘Citizenship’: unrotated solutions 
Items 
2004 2014 
PC1 PC1 
Always to vote in elections 0.4407 0.4311 
Always to obey laws and regulations 0.3460 0.3548 
To keep watch on the actions of government 0.4934 0.4916 
To be active in social or political associations 0.4416 0.4373 
To try to understand the reasoning of people with other 
opinions 
0.4133 0.4231 
That government authorities respect and protect the rights 
of minorities 
0.2772 0.2763 
Eigenvalues (only > 1) 2.35 2.37 
Variance explained (%) 39.17 39.48 
Data source: the ISSP modules ‘Citizenship’. 
 
The ISSP module also has many other items suitable for the analysis of the democratic efficacy 
of citizens. These include multiple items of participation (proxy indicator of political skills), an 
item on political attachment (voting for a party in the last general election, containing categories 
for far-right and far-left party voting), and an item measuring frequency of using media to get 
political news or information (however, included only in the 2014 wave). Finally, the ISSP data 
also includes many socio-demographic characteristics: gender, age, education, household 
income, socio-economic class and place of residence (urban vs. rural). 
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For the analysis of the state and trends of democratic efficacy in democratic polities around the 
world we integrated the scales of political efficacy and support for values of democracy, thus 
constructing three measures of: democratic political efficacy, democratic internal efficacy and 
democratic external efficacy. Before merging the items we dichotomised them in order to get 
fourfold classification of respondents according to all the three scales of democratic efficacy6: 
 Scoring low on both political efficacy and support for values of liberal democracy. 
 Scoring low on political efficacy, but high on support for values of liberal 
democracy. 
 Scoring high on political efficacy, but low on support for values of liberal 
democracy. 
 Scoring high on both political efficacy and support for values of liberal democracy. 
The thresholds of dichotomising the scales were used the following: 
 Political (internal and external) efficacy: low = lowest through 3, high = more than 
3). 
 Support for values of liberal democracy: low = lowest through 5.5, high = more than 
5.5). 
These thresholds are somewhat unbalanced towards the higher values end, since we wanted to 
identify as highly efficacious or strong supporters of liberal democracy only those respondents 
who were clear and not ‘middle-of the-road’ (‘average’) cases. 
5. Results of the longitudinal cross-country analysis 
 
In this section, we present our findings of the secondary data analysis of two the waves (2004 
and 2014) of the ISSP module ‘Citizenship’. On the most general level, in 2004 almost two-
thirds (64.6 %) of respondents scored low on political efficacy, while in 2014 this share dropped 
somewhat to 61.4 %). Low levels of political efficacy are more widespread in Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries. The share of respondents who scored high on both political 
efficacy and support for values of liberal democracy increased somewhat (from 21.5 % to 
                                                 
6 Unfortunately, these groups do not reflect the classification of respondents into four groups 
of political efficacy as suggested previously: highly efficacious, highly non-efficacious, 
paternalists, and sceptics. 
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23.5 %) between 2004 and 2014. However, the share of respondents who score high on political 
efficacy and low on support for values of liberal democracy also increased from 13.9 % to 
15.2 % between 2004 and 2014. Increase in both groups was mostly due to an increase in 
political efficacy in both groups as the share of people strongly supporting values of liberal 
democracy remained almost unchanged (52.3 % in 2004 and 51.9 % in 2014). By and large, the 
increase in political efficacy was more pronounced in the Western countries. 
The scores on the scales of political efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2004 reveal 
that the highest scores of the LE+LL indicator (LE – low score on political efficacy + LL – low 
score on support for values of liberal democracy) were in Czechia (64.7 %), Latvia (60.1 %), 
Hungary (53.5 %), Slovenia (52.0 %) and Belgium: Flanders (51.7 %) (see Table 13). The 
lowest scores were in France (17.0 %), United States (17.5 %), Denmark (17.7 %), Canada 
(20.0 %) and Israel (20.4 %) (see Table 13).  
In the second wave of the 2014 round the highest scores of the LE+LL indicator were again 
mainly among formerly communist Eastern European countries, i.e. in Slovakia (56.1 %), 
Czechia (54.1 %), Belgium: Flanders (49.3 %), Poland (49.2 %) and Slovenia (47.2 %). On the 
other hand, the lowest scores were in Turkey (13.4 %), Iceland (16.4 %), Norway (17.2 %), 
France (18.4 %) and Sweden (19.5 %). 
 
Table 13. Cross-country and temporal distributions of respondents in four groups 
according to scores on the scales of political efficacy and values of liberal democracy, 
percentages 
Country 2014 2004 
LE+LL LE+HL HE+LL HE+HL LE+LL LE+HL HE+LL HE+HL 
Australia 20.5 27.7 14.4 37.4 21.2 37.6 12.4 28.8 
Austria 41.2 24.4 15.0 19.3 35.8 33.4 10.3 20.6 
Belgium: 
Flanders 
49.3 19.5 15.3 15.8 51.7 20.0 16.1 12.1 
Bulgaria     50.5 27.8 10.2 11.5 
Canada     20.0 42.4 7.6 30.0 
Croatia 42.8 37.5 6.0 13.6     
Cyprus     25.1 18.7 19.1 37.0 
Czechia 54.1 21.4 14.7 9.9 64.7 14.6 15.2 5.5 
Denmark 22.0 22.6 22.5 33.0 17.7 23.1 22.0 37.2 
Finland 38.2 18.8 23.0 20.0 44.3 17.6 23.4 14.7 
France 18.4 14.9 29.1 37.5 17.0 15.0 25.3 42.7 
Georgia 26.6 45.5 7.9 20.0     
Germany: East 40.6 15.7 21.2 22.5 50.1 22.6 16.4 10.9 
Germany: West 30.9 16.7 24.8 27.6 37.7 26.8 16.9 18.6 
Great Britain 28.2 29.3 13.7 28.8 39.6 26.0 16.4 18.0 
Hungary 45.3 25.2 13.5 16.1 53.5 23.6 12.5 10.5 
Iceland 16.4 17.8 20.1 45.6     
Ireland     25.1 40.3 10.8 23.8 
Israel: Arabs + 
Jews 
29.9 38.9 11.3 19.9 20.4 41.8 8.7 29.1 
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Country 2014 2004 
LE+LL LE+HL HE+LL HE+HL LE+LL LE+HL HE+LL HE+HL 
Japan 34.9 19.3 23.4 22.4 35.5 19.2 22.6 22.7 
Korea (South) 38.9 38.5 9.1 13.6 39.9 42.2 8.2 9.7 
Latvia     60.1 26.3 6.9 6.7 
Lithuania 42.7 40.3 6.7 10.3     
Netherlands 22.7 23.1 18.4 35.8 27.1 19.3 23.1 30.6 
New Zealand     30.2 23.9 19.3 26.6 
Norway 17.2 17.2 23.7 42.0 23.8 21.4 19.8 35.0 
Poland 49.2 32.7 7.4 10.7 36.1 52.7 3.2 8.1 
Portugal     26.0 51.3 5.5 17.2 
Russia 44.2 25.0 17.7 13.1 43.9 40.2 9.2 6.7 
Slovakia 56.1 23.4 14.3 6.2 50.7 32.0 9.5 7.8 
Slovenia 47.2 41.2 3.8 7.8 52 29.4 11.7 6.9 
South Africa 34.8 41.1 8.6 15.5 24.3 45.3 7.4 23.1 
Spain 27.8 40.2 9.0 23.0 28.2 37.1 12.0 22.7 
Sweden 19.5 24.1 19.3 37.0 29.1 33.9 14.9 22.1 
Switzerland 25.6 12.4 29.7 32.2 33.5 15.2 27.0 24.2 
Turkey 13.4 38.6 12.9 35.0     
United States 22.0 34.0 9.1 34.9 17.5 25.5 11.5 45.5 
Data source: the ISSP modules ‘Citizenship’. 
Notes: LE – low score on political efficacy; HE – high score on political efficacy; LL – low score on support for 
values of liberal democracy; HL – high score on support for values of liberal democracy. 
 
The scores on the scales of political efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2004 indicate 
that the highest scores of the HE+HL indicator (HE – high score on political efficacy + HL – 
high score on support for values of liberal democracy) were in the United States (45.5 %), 
France (42.7 %), Denmark (37.2 %), Cyprus (37.0 %) and Norway (35.0 %) (see Table 13). On 
the opposite side of the HE+HL indicator scale are the former post-communist countries 
Czechia (5.5 %), Latvia (6.7 %), Russia (6.7 %), Slovenia (6.9%) and Slovakia (7.8 %). 
In 2014 the highest scores of the HE+HL indicator were in Iceland (45.6 %), Norway (42.0 %), 
France (37.5 %), Australia (37.4 %) and Sweden (37.0 %). On the other hand, Slovakia (6.2 %), 
Slovenia (7.8 %), Czechia (9.9 %), Lithuania (10.3 %) and Poland (10.7 %) compose a group 
of counties, where the score is the lowest. 
Regarding the score of the LE+HL indicator (LE – low score on political efficacy + HL – high 
score on support for values of liberal democracy), in 2004 the highest score is in Poland 
(52.7 %), Portugal (51.3 %), South Africa (45.3 %), Canada (42.4 %) and South Korea (42.2 %) 
(see Table 13). On the other hand, in Czechia (14.6 %), France (15.0 %), Switzerland (15.2 %), 
Finland (17.6 %) and Cyprus (18.7 %) these scores were the lowest.  
In 2014 the highest scores of the LE+HL indicator were in Georgia (45.5 %), Slovenia (41.2 %), 
South Africa (41.1 %), Lithuania (40.3 %) and Spain (40.2 %). These are the five countries with 
the lowest scores: Switzerland (12.4 %), France (14.9 %), Germany: East (15.7 %), Germany: 
West (16.7 %) and Norway (17.2 %).  
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Finally, the scores on the scales of political efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2004 
reveal that the highest scores of the HE+LL indicator (HE – high score on political efficacy + 
LL – low score on support for values of liberal democracy) is in Switzerland (27.0 %), France 
(25.3 %), Finland (23.4 %), the Netherlands (23.1%) and Japan (22.6 %) (see Table 13). On the 
opposite side on the HE+LL indicator scale is Poland (3.2 %), Portugal (5.5 %), Latvia (6.9 %), 
South Africa (7.4 %) and Canada (7.6 %). In 2014 the highest scores of the HE+LL indicator is 
in Switzerland (29.7 %), France (29.1 %), Germany: West (24.8 %), Norway (23.7 %) and Japan 
(23.4 %). On the other hand, the lowest score is in Slovenia (3.8 %), Croatia (6.0 %), Lithuania 
(6.7 %), Poland (7.4 %) and Georgia (7.9 %). 
 
Table 14. Temporal differences (2014-2004) between shares of groups according to levels 
of democratic political efficacy 
Country Difference 
(LE+LL) 
Difference 
(LE+HL) 
Difference 
(HE+LL) 
Difference 
(HE+HL) 
Sweden -9.6 -9.8 4.4 14.9 
Germany: East -9.5 -6.9 4.8 11.6 
Great Britain -11.4 3.3 -2.7 10.8 
Germany: West -6.8 -10.1 7.9 9.0 
Australia -0.7 -9.9 2.0 8.6 
Switzerland -7.9 -2.8 2.7 8.0 
Norway -6.6 -4.2 3.9 7.0 
Russia 0.3 -15.2 8.5 6.4 
Hungary -8.2 1.6 1.0 5.6 
Finland -6.1 1.2 -0.4 5.3 
Netherlands -4.4 3.8 -4.7 5.2 
Czechia -10.6 6.8 -0.5 4.4 
Korea (South) -1.0 -3.7 0.9 3.9 
Belgium: Flanders -2.4 -0.5 -0.8 3.7 
Poland 13.1 -20.0 4.2 2.6 
Slovenia -4.8 11.8 -7.9 0.9 
Spain -0.4 3.1 -3.0 0.3 
Japan -0.6 0.1 0.8 -0.3 
Austria 5.4 -9.0 4.7 -1.3 
Slovakia 5.4 -8.6 4.8 -1.6 
Denmark 4.3 -0.5 0.5 -4.2 
France 1.4 -0.1 3.8 -5.2 
South Africa 10.5 -4.2 1.2 -7.6 
Israel: Arabs + Jews 9.5 -2.9 2.6 -9.2 
United States 4.5 8.5 -2.4 -10.6 
Data source: the ISSP modules ‘Citizenship’. 
Notes: LE – low score on political efficacy; HE – high score on political efficacy; LL – low score on support for 
values of liberal democracy; HL – high score on support for values of liberal democracy. 
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From Table 14 we see that the increase in groups of HE+LL and HE+HL was mostly due to 
increasing levels of political efficacy in some democratic countries7. Figures 1 and 2 show 
country differences in profiles of distributions of separate groups. In 2004 high democratic 
efficacy was relatively more pronounced in only two countries: the United States and Denmark. 
 
 
Fig.1. Relative cross-country distributions of respondents into four groups according to scores 
on the scales of political efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2004. 
 
In 2014 the ‘picture’ changed and we clearly see that many more countries may be identified 
as having a relatively sizeable share of population scoring high on political efficacy and strongly 
supporting values of liberal democracy: Iceland, Australia, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark 
and Norway. 
 
                                                 
7 However, in some Western countries, such as, Denmark, France, Israel and United States 
efficacy decreased substantially. 
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Fig.2. Relative cross-country distributions of respondents into four groups according to scores 
on the scales of political efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2014. 
 
Further, we present results of analysis of tendencies with regard to external democratic efficacy. 
On the most general level, in 2004 almost three-fourths (74.3 %) of respondents scored low on 
external political efficacy, while in 2014 this share dropped slightly to 70.5 %. Low levels of 
external political efficacy again appeared to be more widespread in the CEE countries. The 
share of respondents who scored high on both external political efficacy and support for values 
of liberal democracy increased only slightly from 15.5 % to 17.7 % between 2004 and 2014. 
The share of respondents who scored high on external political efficacy and low on support for 
values of liberal democracy remained relatively stable (10.3 % in 2004 and 11.8 % in 2014). 
Thus, external democratic efficacy remained rather stable during the studied period. 
The scores on the scales of external efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2004 reveal 
that the highest scores of the LE+LL indicator (LE – low score on external political efficacy + 
LL – low score on support for values of liberal democracy) were in Czechia (68.3 %), Latvia 
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(61.7 %), Belgium: Flanders (59.2 %), Hungary (58.3 %) and Germany: East (57.8 %) (see 
Table 15). The lowest scores of the LE+LL indicator were in the United States (20.7 %), France 
(21.6 %), Canada (22.2 %), Denmark (23.5 %) and Israel (24.4 %).  
In 2014, we have another group of countries where the highest scores of the LE+LL indicator 
are mainly in Eastern Europe, i.e. Czechia (58.4 %), Slovakia (57.0 %), Belgium: Flanders 
(54.0 %), Poland (51.2 %) and Slovenia (48.1 %). On the opposite side of the LE+LL indicator 
scale are Turkey (14.0 %), Iceland (20.8 %), Norway (22.1 %), Sweden (23.7 %) and the United 
States (24.5 %). 
Regarding the score of the HE+HL indicator (HE – high score on external political efficacy + 
HL – high score on support for values of liberal democracy), in 2004 the highest scores were 
in France (34.9 %), the United States (34.6 %), Cyprus (27.7 %), Denmark (27.6 %) and 
Norway (27.5 %) (see Table 15). On the other hand, this score was the lowest in countries, 
which had communist regimes after WWII, i.e. Czechia (3.2 %), Slovakia (3.4 %), Latvia 
(5.0 %), Germany: East (5.8 %) and Slovenia (5.8 %). 
 
Table 15. Cross-country and temporal distributions of respondents in four groups 
according to scores on the scales of external efficacy and values of liberal democracy, 
percentages 
Country 2014 2004 
LE+LL LE+HL HE+LL HE+HL LE+LL LE+HL HE+LL HE+HL 
Australia 25.8 41.6 9.2 23.4 26.1 49.0 7.5 17.4 
Austria 47.1 31.9 9.1 11.9 38.0 42.7 7.9 11.4 
Belgium: 
Flanders 
54.0 25.5 10.7 9.8 59.2 26.0 8.6 6.2 
Bulgaria     54.2 31.9 6.6 7.3 
Canada     22.2 51.9 5.5 20.4 
Croatia 45.7 45.4 3.1 5.7     
Cyprus     27.8 28.2 16.3 27.7 
Czechia 58.4 24.4 10.5 6.7 68.3 16.9 11.6 3.2 
Denmark 29.7 32.7 14.9 22.7 23.5 32.6 16.2 27.6 
Finland 43.2 23.6 18.2 15.0 49.5 21.3 18.5 10.8 
France 25.6 25.2 22.0 27.2 21.6 22.6 20.9 34.9 
Georgia 27.3 49.8 7.3 15.6     
Germany: East 46.9 22.3 14.9 15.8 57.8 28.0 8.4 5.8 
Germany: West 36.3 21.2 19.4 23.1 43.1 34.8 11.7 10.4 
Great Britain 33.0 38.9 9.1 19.1 45.0 32.0 11.2 11.9 
Hungary 47.3 28.2 11.5 13.0 58.3 26.4 7.7 7.6 
Iceland 20.8 26.4 15.8 37.1     
Ireland     27.5 50.1 8.3 14.1 
Israel: Arabs + 
Jews 
33.9 44.2 7.3 14.6 24.4 53.0 4.7 17.9 
Japan 36.1 20.5 22.3 21.1 39 23.4 19.3 18.3 
Korea (South) 40.4 41.1 7.5 11.0 40.8 43.5 7.4 8.3 
Latvia     61.7 27.9 5.4 5.0 
Lithuania 44.8 42.2 4.5 8.5     
Netherlands 28.4 31.9 12.7 27.0 33.6 27.6 16.5 22.3 
New Zealand     37 32.6 12.6 17.8 
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Country 2014 2004 
LE+LL LE+HL HE+LL HE+HL LE+LL LE+HL HE+LL HE+HL 
Norway 22.1 23.5 18.8 35.6 27.8 28.7 15.9 27.5 
Poland 51.2 36.0 5.5 7.3 37.4 54.6 1.9 6.0 
Portugal     27.6 56.8 3.6 12.0 
Russia 45.7 25.4 16.3 12.7 45.2 40.9 7.9 6.0 
Slovakia 57.0 22.5 13.7 6.8 54.9 36.4 5.3 3.4 
Slovenia 48.1 45.3 3.0 3.7 55.6 30.3 8.2 5.8 
South Africa 35.6 42.9 7.8 13.6 25.4 48.6 6.4 19.6 
Spain 32.5 51.5 4.4 11.5 31.9 44.5 8.3 15.3 
Sweden 23.7 32.1 15.3 29.0 33.3 40.1 10.6 16.0 
Switzerland 29.6 17.7 25.8 26.9 36.1 19.9 24.3 19.6 
Turkey 14.0 41.8 12.2 32.0     
United States 24.5 45.7 6.6 23.2 20.7 36.5 8.3 34.6 
Data source: the ISSP modules ‘Citizenship’. 
Notes: LE – low score on external political efficacy; HE – high score on external political efficacy; LL – low score 
on support for values of liberal democracy; HL – high score on support for values of liberal democracy. 
 
In 2014 the highest scores of the HE+HL indicator were in Iceland (37.1 %), Norway (35.6 %), 
Turkey (32.0 %), Sweden (29.0 %) and France (27.2 %). Five former post-communist countries 
had the lowest scores: Slovenia (3.7 %), Croatia (5.7 %), Czechia (6.7 %), Slovakia (6.8 %) 
and Poland (7.3 %).  
The scores on the scales of political efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2004 indicate 
that the highest scores of the LE+HL indicator (LE – low score on external political efficacy + 
HL – high score on support for values of liberal democracy) were in Portugal (56.8 %), Poland 
(54.6 %), Israel (53.0 %), Canada (51.9 %) and Ireland (50.1 %) (see Table 15). On the opposite 
side of the LE+HL indicator scale are these countries: Czechia (16.9 %), Switzerland (19.9 %), 
Finland (21.3 %), France (22.6 %) and Japan (23.4 %). 
In 2014 the highest scores of the LE+HL indicator were in Spain (51.5 %), Georgia (49.8 %), 
United States (45.7 %), Croatia (45.4 %) and Slovenia (45.3 %). Switzerland (17.7 %), Japan 
(20.5 %), Germany: West (21.2 %), Germany: East (22.3 %) and Slovakia (22.5 %) compose a 
group of countries, where the scores were the lowest. 
Finally, the scores on the scales of political efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2004 
reveal that the highest scores of the HE+LL indicator (HE – high score on external political 
efficacy + LL – low score on support for values of liberal democracy) were in Switzerland 
(24.3 %), France (20.9 %), Japan (19.3 %), Finland (18.5 %) and the Netherlands (16.5 %) (see 
Table 15). On the opposite side of the HE+LL indicator scale are Poland (1.9 %), Portugal 
(3.6 %), Israel (4.7 %), Slovakia (5.3 %) and Latvia (5.4 %). 
In 2014 the highest scores of the HE+LL indicator one might see in Switzerland (25.8 %), Japan 
(22.3 %), France (22.0 %), Germany: West (19.4 %) and Norway (18.8 %). Again, the lowest 
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scores were mainly in Central and Eastern European countries, i.e. Slovenia (3.0 %), Croatia 
(3.1 %), Spain (4.4 %), Lithuania (4.5 %) and Poland (5.5 %). 
In Table 16 we see that temporal changes with regard to external democratic efficacy are very 
similar to the case of the general democratic efficacy: an increase in HE+HL was most 
pronounced among the Western countries8. 
 
Table 16. Temporal differences (2014-2004) between shares of groups according to levels 
of external democratic efficacy 
Country Difference 
(LE+LL) 
Difference 
(LE+HL) 
Difference 
(HE+LL) 
Difference 
(HE+HL) 
Sweden -9.6 -8.0 4.7 13.0 
Germany: West -6.8 -13.6 7.7 12.7 
Germany: East -10.9 -5.7 6.5 10.0 
Norway -5.7 -5.2 2.9 8.1 
Switzerland -6.5 -2.2 1.5 7.3 
Great Britain -12.0 6.9 -2.1 7.2 
Russia 0.5 -15.5 8.4 6.7 
Australia -0.3 -7.4 1.7 6.0 
Hungary -11.0 1.8 3.8 5.4 
Netherlands -5.2 4.3 -3.8 4.7 
Finland -6.3 2.3 -0.3 4.2 
Belgium: Flanders -5.2 -0.5 2.1 3.6 
Czechia -9.9 7.5 -1.1 3.5 
Slovakia 2.1 -13.9 8.4 3.4 
Japan -2.9 -2.9 3 2.8 
Korea (South) -0.4 -2.4 0.1 2.7 
Poland 13.8 -18.6 3.6 1.3 
Austria 9.1 -10.8 1.2 0.5 
Slovenia -7.5 15 -5.2 -2.1 
Israel: Arabs + Jews 9.5 -8.8 2.6 -3.3 
Spain 0.6 7.0 -3.9 -3.8 
Denmark 6.2 0.1 -1.3 -4.9 
South Africa 10.2 -5.7 1.4 -6.0 
France 4.0 2.6 1.1 -7.7 
United States 3.8 9.2 -1.7 -11.4 
Data source: the ISSP modules ‘Citizenship’. 
Notes: LE – low score on political efficacy; HE – high score on political efficacy; LL – low score on support for 
values of liberal democracy; HL – high score on support for values of liberal democracy. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show country differences in profiles of distributions of separate groups. In 2004 
high external political efficiency was relatively more pronounced in Cyprus, United States, 
Denmark, and Norway. 
                                                 
8 However, in some Western countries, such as, Denmark, France and United States external 
democratic efficacy decreased substantially. 
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Fig.3. Relative cross-country distributions of respondents into four groups according to scores 
on the scales of external efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2004. 
 
In 2014 the ‘picture’ changed only moderately as the Netherlands, Norway and Iceland (not 
studied in 2004) joined the club of countries with a relatively large share of highly effective 
citizens who are strong supporters of liberal democracy. 
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Fig.4. Relative cross-country distributions of respondents into four groups according to scores 
on the scales of external efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2014. 
 
Finally, we present results of analysis of tendencies with regard to democratic internal efficacy. 
On the most general level, in 2004 about half (50.6 %) of respondents scored low on internal 
political efficacy, and in 2014 this share remained almost the same (51.7 %). Low levels of 
internal political efficacy are again more widespread in CEE countries. The share of 
respondents who scored high on both internal political efficacy and support for values of liberal 
democracy remained almost unchanged (28.8 % in 2004 and 28.2 % in 2014). The same was 
true about the share of respondents who score high on internal political efficacy and low on 
support for values of liberal democracy (20.5 % in 2004 and 20.2 % in 2014). Thus, internal 
democratic efficacy remained rather stable during the studied period (similar to the trends with 
regard to external democratic efficacy). 
The scores on the scales of internal efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2004 reveal that 
the highest scores of the LE+LL indicator (LE – low score on internal political efficacy + LL – 
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low score on support for values of liberal democracy) were in former post-communist countries, 
i.e. Czechia (53.5%), Latvia (51.4%), Hungary (46.0%), Japan (42.0 %) and Slovenia (41.5 %) 
(see Table 17). The lowest scores were in old democracies: Australia (11.7 %), Canada (13.1 %), 
United States (13.5 %), Denmark (13.8 %) and Israel (13.9 %). 
In the second wave of the ISSP module ‘Citizenship’ (2014) the highest scores of the LE+LL 
indicator were in Slovakia (49.3 %), Russia (45.6 %), Hungary (42.8 %), Japan (42.4 %) and 
Czechia (41.3 %). On the other hand, the lowest scores were again in the group of the old 
democracies, i.e. Australia (12.5 %), the Netherlands (13.7 %), Iceland (13.9 %), Denmark 
(16.0 %) and Norway (16.2 %). 
 
Table 17. Cross-country and temporal distributions of respondents in four groups 
according to scores on the scales of internal efficacy and values of liberal democracy, 
percentages. 
Country 2014 2004 
LE+LL LE+HL HE+LL HE+HL LE+LL LE+HL HE+LL HE+HL 
Australia 12.5 15.0 22.5 50.0 11.7 19.6 21.8 47.0 
Austria 33.4 19.6 22.8 24.2 25.4 20.7 20.6 33.3 
Belgium: 
Flanders 
31.8 12.6 32.3 23.3 28.3 9.6 39.1 23.0 
Bulgaria     41.3 21.5 19.4 17.8 
Canada     13.1 24.4 14.2 48.4 
Croatia 28.2 20.7 20.6 30.4     
Cyprus     25.4 17.6 18.6 38.3 
Czechia 41.3 16.1 27.4 15.1 53.5 9.7 26.2 10.6 
Denmark 16.0 14.2 28.5 41.3 13.8 18.2 25.9 42.2 
Finland 30.0 14.3 31.1 24.7 36.3 13.2 31.5 19.0 
France 22.0 20.0 25.6 32.4 19.6 22.6 22.3 35.5 
Georgia 23.0 39.7 11.4 25.9     
Germany: East 27.3 13.7 34.5 24.5 31.4 9.8 35.1 23.7 
Germany: West 25.3 13.5 30.0 31.3 27.5 16.8 26.9 28.8 
Great Britain 20.9 20.0 21.1 38.0 29.3 15.1 27.0 28.6 
Hungary 42.8 24.6 15.9 16.8 46.0 20.6 19.7 13.7 
Iceland 13.9 14.6 22.6 48.8     
Ireland     13.9 18.8 22.0 45.3 
Israel: Arabs + 
Jews 
24.5 32.0 15.9 27.6 13.9 31.1 15.1 39.9 
Japan 42.4 26.4 16.5 14.8 42.0 24.3 16.1 17.7 
Korea (South) 36.4 34.6 11.5 17.5 37.6 39.6 10.5 12.2 
Latvia     51.4 22.4 15.4 10.8 
Lithuania 37.1 36.7 12.0 14.2     
Netherlands 13.7 13.6 27.1 45.6 18.1 12.4 31.9 37.6 
New Zealand     18.6 11.8 30.9 38.6 
Norway 16.2 16.2 24.7 42.9 17.4 15.5 26.2 41.0 
Poland 39.8 25.5 16.6 18.1 29.5 43.3 9.8 17.5 
Portugal     20.6 35.4 10.9 33.1 
Russia 45.6 28.2 16.3 9.9 40.5 36.0 12.3 11.2 
Slovakia 49.3 20.7 20.9 9.1 37.2 21.1 23.1 18.7 
Slovenia 32.8 24.9 17.9 24.3 41.5 23.0 22.5 13.0 
South Africa 32.6 37.9 10.8 18.7 23.1 45.7 8.4 22.8 
Spain 18.0 22.7 18.7 40.6 22.5 28.1 17.5 31.9 
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Country 2014 2004 
LE+LL LE+HL HE+LL HE+HL LE+LL LE+HL HE+LL HE+HL 
Sweden 17.7 21.4 21.0 40.0 23.3 25.5 20.6 30.6 
Switzerland 25.9 13.3 29.5 31.3 32.9 14.2 27.7 25.2 
Turkey 18.6 52.5 7.8 21.0     
United States 17.1 25.5 14.0 43.5 13.5 19.9 15.5 51.1 
Data source: the ISSP modules ‘Citizenship’. 
Notes: LE – low score on internal political efficacy; HE – high score on internal political efficacy; LL – low score 
on support for values of liberal democracy; HL – high score on support for values of liberal democracy. 
 
The scores on the scales of internal efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2004 indicate 
that the highest scores of the HE+HL indicator (HE – high score on internal political efficacy 
+ HL – high score on support for values of liberal democracy) were in the United States 
(51.1 %), Canada (48.4 %), Australia (47.0 %), Ireland (45.3 %) and Denmark (42.2%) (see 
Table 17). On the opposite side of the HE+HL indicator scale were these countries: Czechia 
(10.6 %), Latvia (10.8 %), Russia (11.2 %), South Korea (12.2 %) and Slovenia (13.0 %). 
In 2014 the highest scores of the HE+HL indicator were in Australia (50.0 %), Iceland (48.8 %), 
the Netherlands (45.6 %), the United States (43.5 %) and Norway (42.9 %). On the other hand, 
Slovakia (9.1 %), Russia (9.9 %), Lithuania (14.2 %), Japan (14.8 %) and Czechia (15.1 %) 
composed a group of counties, where the scores were the lowest. 
Regarding the score of the LE+HL indicator (LE – low score on internal political efficacy + HL 
– high score on support for values of liberal democracy), in 2004 the highest scores were in 
South Africa (45.7 %), Poland (43.3 %), South Korea (39.6 %) Russia (36.0 %) and Portugal 
(35.4 %) (see Table 17). On the other hand, in Belgium: Flanders (9.6 %), Czechia (9.7 %), 
Germany: East (9.8 %), New Zealand (11.8 %) and the Netherlands (12.4 %) these scores were 
the lowest. 
In 2014 the highest scores of the LE+HL indicator were in Turkey (52.5 %), Georgia (39.7 %), 
South Africa (37.9 %), Lithuania (36.7 %) and South Korea (34.6 %). And these were the five 
countries with the lowest scores: Belgium: Flanders (12.6 %), Switzerland (13.3 %), Germany: 
West (13.5 %), the Netherlands (13.6 %) and Germany: East (13.7 %). 
Finally, the scales of internal efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2004 reveal that the 
highest scores of the HE+LL indicator (HE – high score on internal political efficacy + LL – 
low score on support for values of liberal democracy) were in Belgium: Flanders (39.1 %), 
Germany: East (35.1 %), the Netherlands (31.9 %), Finland (31.5 %), and New Zealand 
(30.9 %) (see Table 17). On the opposite side of the HE+LL indicator scale were South Africa 
(8.4 %), Poland (9.8 %), South Korea (10.5 %), Portugal (10.9 %) and Russia (12.3 %). 
In 2014 the highest scores of the HE+LL indicator were again in countries of Western Europe: 
Germany: East (34.5 %), Belgium: Flanders (32.3 %), Finland (31.1 %), Germany: West 
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(30.0 %) and Switzerland (29.5 %). And the lowest scores were these countries: Turkey (7.8 %), 
South Africa (10.8 %), Georgia (11.4 %), South Korea (11.5 %) and Lithuania (12.0 %). 
 
Table 18. Temporal differences (2014-2004) between shares of groups according to levels 
of internal democratic efficacy 
Country Difference 
(LE+LL) 
Difference 
(LE+HL) 
Difference 
(HE+LL) 
Difference 
(HE+HL) 
Slovenia -8.7 1.9 -4.6 11.3 
Great Britain -8.4 4.9 -5.9 9.4 
Sweden -5.6 -4.1 0.4 9.4 
Spain -4.5 -5.4 1.2 8.7 
Netherlands -4.4 1.2 -4.8 8 
Switzerland -7 -0.9 1.8 6.1 
Finland -6.3 1.1 -0.4 5.7 
Korea (South) -1.2 -5 1 5.3 
Czechia -12.2 6.4 1.2 4.5 
Hungary -3.2 4 -3.8 3.1 
Australia 0.8 -4.6 0.7 3 
Germany: West -2.2 -3.3 3.1 2.5 
Norway -1.2 0.7 -1.5 1.9 
Germany: East -4.1 3.9 -0.6 0.8 
Poland 10.3 -17.8 6.8 0.6 
Belgium: Flanders 3.5 3 -6.8 0.3 
Denmark 2.2 -4 2.6 -0.9 
Russia 5.1 -7.8 4 -1.3 
Japan 0.4 2.1 0.4 -2.9 
France 2.4 -2.6 3.3 -3.1 
South Africa 9.5 -7.8 2.4 -4.1 
United States 3.6 5.6 -1.5 -7.6 
Austria 8 -1.1 2.2 -9.1 
Slovakia 12.1 -0.4 -2.2 -9.6 
Israel: Arabs + Jews 10.6 0.9 0.8 -12.3 
Data source: the ISSP modules ‘Citizenship’. 
Notes: LE – low score on political efficacy; HE – high score on political efficacy; LL – low score on support for 
values of liberal democracy; HL – high score on support for values of liberal democracy. 
 
In Table 18 we see that temporal changes with regard to internal democratic efficacy are again 
similar to other forms of democratic efficacy: an increase in HE+HL was most pronounced 
among the Western countries (with the exception of the United States, Austria and Israel). 
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Fig.5. Relative cross-country distributions of respondents into four groups according to scores 
on the scales of internal efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2004. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 show country differences in profiles of distributions of separate groups. In 2004 
high internal democratic efficiency was relatively more pronounced in a number of Western 
countries: The United States, Australia, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, France, Cyprus and Austria. 
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Fig.6. Relative cross-country distributions of respondents into four groups according to scores 
on the scales of internal efficacy and values of liberal democracy in 2014. 
 
In 2014 the ‘picture’ changed somewhat as high internal political efficiency was relatively more 
pronounced in Australia, Iceland, Spain, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands and Great Britain. 
To summarise, a majority of the populations in the studied countries scored low on both scales 
(internal, a little more than 50 %, and external, a little more than 70 %) of political efficacy. 
Low levels of political efficacy are more widespread in CEE countries. Moreover, these low 
levels of political efficacy are rather stable over time if looked at the aggregate level. However, 
at the country level there were certain changes, as in some (mostly Western) countries political 
efficacy increased from 2004 to 2014. Finally, support for values of democracy is also rather 
stable over time. However, it is quite low, as only about half of the populations in the studied 
countries are strong supporters of the values of liberal democracy. 
6. Conclusions 
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This paper aimed at defining and studying general trends of democratic efficacy around the 
world. Regarding the definition of the concept of democratic efficacy we presented two 
conceptualisations: 1) more extensive (holistic) coupling political efficacy with citizens’ 
democratic capacities and values, and 2) less extensive (narrow, minimal) coupling political 
efficacy with only citizens’ support for important democratic values. The first conceptualisation 
of democratic efficacy complements political efficacy with five types of democratic capacities 
and values: factual political knowledge of citizens; habits of political news consumption; 
citizen’s political reflexivity; support for core values of democracy (equality of interests, 
political autonomy and reciprocity); political or civic skills. 
However, even though this conceptualisation is more encompassing and fine-grained, it does 
not allow us to study the trends of democratic efficacy in the historical-temporal perspective, 
as there is no data that could be employed for this type of study. Therefore, we introduced a less 
extensive conceptualisation of democratic efficacy that includes only attitudinal aspects. We 
believe that this might be considered a minimal definition of democratic efficacy. It couples 
political efficacy with support for important values of democracy conceptualised according to 
Diamond and Morlino (2005) and including eight dimensions: five procedural (rule of law, 
competition, participation, horizontal and vertical accountability), two substantive (freedom 
and equality), and one results oriented (responsiveness). Although this definition only captures 
attitudinal aspect of democratic efficacy neglecting behavioural and reflexive capacities, it is 
nonetheless useful in cross-cultural and historical analysis employing survey data. 
After analysing data from the two modules of ISSP (Citizenship I conducted in 2004 and 
Citizenship II conducted in 2014) we found that, overall, changes over the last decades in 
democratic efficacy are negligible. However, there are important differences with regard to 
levels of internal and external political efficacy and their trends in separate countries and 
regions. First of all, we found that the majority of the populations in the studied countries scored 
low on both internal (a little more than 50 %) and external (a little more than 70 %) political 
efficacy. However, the difference between the two dimensions is substantial and should not be 
neglected in future studies of political efficacy. It is quite a usual practice in political research 
to study external dimension of political efficacy (beliefs about responsiveness of the political 
system) without including internal aspect of political efficacy (beliefs in competence to 
understand and participate in politics). Results of our study indicate that this might involve a 
risk to overlook much higher levels of internal compared to external political efficacy. 
Moreover, it seems that the most appropriate way of studying trends of political efficacy is to 
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analyse the two dimensions separately, especially when political efficacy is integrated with 
other types of political capacities and values. 
With regard to support for the values of liberal democracy we found that it is moderate (only 
half of the studied populations showed strong support for these values) and rather stable, at least 
when looking at the general trends. At the country level, we see quite a lot of variation both 
across countries and over time. For example, support for values of liberal democracy was very 
high both in 2004 and 2014 in countries such as the US (71.0 % and 69.0 %, respectively) and 
Australia (66.7 % and 65.0 %, respectively). However, in other countries it decreased rather 
substantially, as for example, in Poland (from 60.7 % in 2004 to 43.5 % in 2014) and Israel 
(from 70.8 % in 2004 to 58.5 % in 2014). And yet in some other countries it increased 
substantially, as for example, in Britain (from 43.9 % in 2004 to 58.0 % in 2014) and the 
Netherlands (from 49.9 % in 2004 to 58.9 % in 2014).  
Similarly, levels of political efficacy are quite different across countries and there is substantial 
cross-time variation for at least half of the countries. According to our data, there is a general 
tendency of lower levels of political efficacy in the CEE countries. Also, in some (mostly 
Western) countries political efficacy increased from 2004 to 2014. These temporal changes and 
cross-country variation of both levels of political efficacy and support for values of liberal 
democracy produce yet other constellations of cross-time and cross-country differences in 
democratic political efficacy. For example, levels of democratic efficacy are markedly lower 
than those of democratic internal efficacy (around 1/6 compared to more than 1/4). Thus, these 
differences need to be further studied with multilevel models including different macro 
(country) level explanatory variables. Among such variables, influence of type of political, 
educational and media institutions, socio-economic development and cultural values should be 
studied. 
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